Screen a new client in Saint Vincent and the Grenadines before you book.

It's a shared safety list built by adult workers, for adult workers. Workers file reports on clients whose behaviour shouldn't reach the next booking: violence, broken consent, non-payment, harassment, doxxing, recording without consent, suspected stings. Before you take a booking, you can run the contact details a client has given you against the list. Think of it as one piece of your screening, not the whole of it.

Open the "Check a contact" tab on this page, type in the phone number (with country) or the email the client sent you, and submit. You'll see whether anyone has reported that contact, what kinds of harm were flagged, and roughly how recently. No account needed, and no worker identity is attached to the lookup.

Any adult worker who has been on the receiving end of harmful behaviour. No account, no invite, no waiting list. Reports go live the moment they're submitted. We watch for abuse patterns and can soft-block sources that look retaliatory or coordinated, but worker accuracy is the foundation. The audit trail keeps it honest.

Safety, consent, and financial harms. Not bad manners. The tags on the report form cover violence or threats, condom removal or other broken limits, non-payment or scams, harassment or stalking, doxxing or outing, recording you without consent, and suspected stings. Optional modifiers note slurs, intoxication, weapons, and whether the person had been a regular before the incident. Sugrl is not a review site. "Rude" and "low tipper" do not belong here.

Reporter names are never displayed. Not on the public listing, not to the reported client, not anywhere a future booking could surface them. The description you write is scrubbed on our servers before it's saved: URLs, social handles, stray phone numbers and emails, and giveaway phrases like 'my name is' or 'I work at' all get stripped automatically. We don't send confirmation emails that could land in your inbox or your billing trail.

Every phone number and email is normalised, then hashed with a server-side secret (SHA-256 with a pepper) before it's written to the database. The original contact details never sit in plain text. That means the blocklist isn't a browsable directory. A lookup can only confirm a match for a number or email you already have in hand. If the database were ever exposed, the stored hashes wouldn't reverse back into a usable contact list.

Every listing has an appeal link the reported person can use. While an appeal is open, the listing is restricted. A human reviews it and responds within 14 days. We also run pattern-detection on incoming reports, so sources that look coordinated or retaliatory get soft-blocked, and obvious abuse is removed. Outcomes aren’t emailed. The appellant comes back to the listing to see the result.

No. The blocklist exists for worker safety, and it stays that way. We don't hand it to law enforcement, immigration authorities, payment processors, agencies, advertising platforms, or other booking sites. We don't sell, licence, or syndicate the data either. The only people who see a match are workers running a check.

The blocklist is global. Any worker worldwide can report or check a contact, and the corpus is shared across every country. Phone numbers are matched in E.164 international format, so a number reported from one country surfaces on a check run from anywhere. Emails are matched globally too. We don't gate the list by jurisdiction.

Immediately. As soon as the report passes validation and the description is scrubbed, it's live for the next worker to find. There's no moderation queue before publication. Speed is the whole point: a bad date can reach a second worker within hours of the first, and a blocklist that lags by days is no use to anyone.

Effectively, no. Because contact details are hashed before storage, a client can only confirm whether one specific number or email they already know is on the list. They can't browse it, scrape it, or pull down a directory of reported people. Rate limits and bot challenges make even targeted probing impractical. The design protects workers' reports from being reverse-engineered.

Reports are kept as long as they remain useful for worker safety. There’s no fixed expiry, because behaviour that was unsafe two years ago can still be unsafe today. To withdraw a report you filed yourself, use the same appeal link any reported person would use, and identify yourself as the reporter. A human reviews and removes confirmed retractions within the same 14-day window.

Treat the blocklist as one layer in a stack. A solid screening routine pairs it with a real name and a verifiable reference (a work email, an employer link, or a vouch from another provider), a deposit on a method that's hard to reverse, a phone or video call before the booking, a buddy who knows your timing and location, and your own read on the conversation. If a client fails any of these, walk away. The blocklist is one safety signal. It isn't the whole decision.

No. An empty result means nobody has reported this number or email yet. That isn't the same as the client being safe. First-time offenders, clients using a fresh contact, and clients whose previous workers were too afraid to report all come back clean. Treat "no match" as "no information," not as a green light. The rest of your screening still matters.

Yes. Report whenever you're ready. There's no time limit, and a late report still protects the next worker. Processing what happened takes time, and plenty of workers wait until they're physically or financially safe to file. If a phone number or an email is all you remember, that's enough to file a report.